Homeland Security: The Taliban Terrorist Group
Introduction
The Taliban is currently one of the most problematic militia groups on the globe because of its advanced position and powers, enabling it to control a lot of resources. Afghanistan has a history of being a terrorist hub due to its political instability, complex ethnic makeup, and high levels of conflict. However, militia groups like the Taliban are among the reasons why this region can hardly achieve economic development as they spread terror within Afghanistan’s borders and encourage the development of other insurgents. The Taliban has engaged in a power struggle over Afghanistan for more than two decades. Recently, the militia group has regained control of the region after the US pulled out its troops from the country. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the militia group, a brief background, its history, ideologies, geographic makeup, its structures, force multipliers, and operational attributes.
History, Background, and Overview of the Taliban
The Taliban Militia, or Ṭālebān, which means ‘students’ in Pashto, is an ultraconservative religious and political faction established in the early and mid-1990s in Afghanistan. However, in the beginning, it described itself as a group of enlightened scholars and students seeking to eradicate corruption and crime in the region, thus its name (Meszaros, 2019). The Taliban generally comprised of farmers and peasants studying Islam in Pakistani and Afghanistan religious schools, consolidating its strengths and securing resources in the southern parts of Afghanistan. The group had conquered most of the southern regions of the country by 1994. By September 1996, the Taliban invaded and took full control of Kabul after killing the President (Akhtar & Khan, 2021). Following these developments, it instituted strict Qur‘an instructions, which led to the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In addition, the militia wreaked havoc on political adversaries, who were captured, tortured, or assassinated.
The Taliban rule in Afghanistan was limited by several barriers as they faced notable resistance from other ethnic groups. The Taliban took advantage of religious ideologies, traditionalism, and conservative social codes to create a brutal regime that suppressed religious minorities. As a result, resistance against the Taliban was pronounced among all other non-Pashtun ethnic communities, including the Hazara, Uzbek, and Tajik (Ruttig, 2021). After the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the Taliban was ousted from power by the US military and campaigns against al-Qa‘ida. The Taliban was a major ally of al-Qa‘ida and allowed the terrorist group to establish its base in Afghanistan and openly recruit, train, and deploy terrorists to other nations (Meszaros, 2019). Thus, abolishing the Taliban rule and limiting its access to resources was one of the priorities of the war against terrorism after the September 911 attacks.
Geographic Makeup, Population, and Activities
The Taliban has grown its influence and established deeper roots in the whole of Afghanistan over several years. Initially, the Taliban government had its strongholds in the southern regions of Afghanistan, especially in Kandahar, which was the home of its spiritual leader, Mullah Muhammed Omar (Kanayama, 2021). However, through coercion and intimidation, the group gained more influence in the northern regions, particularly in Mazar-e Sharif, where it took advantage of the Soviet-made airfield for its initiatives. Similarly, the Taliban advanced the operations in Helmand, Zabul, and poppy fields scattered all over the region as the drug trade business provided them with unmatched resources (Meszaros, 2019). As a result, they have the power and capability to control the region’s economy and coerce others into doing as they wish.
Since the 90s, the Taliban has recruited millions of individuals into its movement by spreading extremist messages and spearheading radicalization. Its religious inclinations allow the Taliban to take advantage of its values to oppress others and wage war against non-Islamic ethnic and religious groups (Jackson & Amiri, 2019). According to UN and US intelligence agency estimates, the Taliban has roughly 58,000 to 100,000 fighters stationed in Afghanistan, with this number fluctuating occasionally depending on the nature of conflicts and battle conditions (Ruttig, 2021). In recent months, the Taliban government has regained total control over Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s activities in Afghanistan generally constitute low-level hit-and-run and ambush attacks followed by occasional high-level attacks. In the first six months of 2015, the number of complex suicide attacks perpetrated by the group in Afghanistan increased by 78% compared to the same period of the previous year (Afghan Taliban, n.d.). Thus, it is evident that the group has been gaining power with time (Akhtar & Khan, 2021). In 2015, the group organized a series of attacks on Kabul, resulting in the death of about 60 individuals, making it one of the deadliest massacres in the capital. However, the attacks generally target security forces and the police in Afghanistan. The group targets foreigners as well, including NGO workers, diplomats, and facilities known to be occupied by foreigners (Jackson & Amiri, 2019). The group has shown open enmity against western countries as they support groups like the al-Qa‘ida and justify attacks carried out on the NATO States.
Taliban Ideologies, Tactical Behaviors, and Methodologies
The Taliban has political and religious ideologies that revolve around Islamic nationalism. Since its establishment, the group promised to take over Afghanistan and restore it to its initial state, which was free from external influence. The Taliban hold that they are devout Muslims and believers who fight for God and the prevalence of good (Jackson & Amiri, 2019). As a result, they spearhead their vision of a new Afghanistan by waging war and rejecting western ideas that do not resonate with their Sharia laws. However, their mission is also politically affiliated as they claim a diplomatic mission of evacuating external powers that supposedly take advantage of their resources, oppress people, and kill innocent Afghans. Consequently, they advocate for traditional social codes established by their laws, which is against tarnishing their religion and cultural beliefs.
The Taliban uses both conventional and unconventional tactics to attack and subdue their enemies. Its most common solution to reigning terror is bombing its targets. Its tactics against the Afghan military involve isolation, where they seal military camps from their bases of support, thus depriving Afghan soldiers psychologically and physically (Schroden, 2021). Over time, the group has altered its approaches due to increased organization and access to warfare resources. Currently, it takes advantage of social media as an instrument to send out terrorizing messages to global populations. Moreover, Ruttig (2021) suggests that the group recently adopted a new tactic that involves negotiations to constrain military powers in Afghanistan and buy time. This approach allows them to plan their operations and limits the US’s ability to deal with them.
Originally, the Taliban’s methodology was more basic than described above: ambushes and suicide attacks on government posts. However, as pressure from the superior American military mounted, the Taliban had to modify and adapt its methodology. For example, the Taliban fighters started masking their mortar positions, made their bases mobile, improved their discipline, and started using mines and RPGs more extensively (Giustozzi, 2022). Aside from changing their fighting methods, the Taliban relied on blackmailing Afghan security forces by targeting their families and infiltrating them (Giustozzi, 2022). Knowing that the coalition’s forces can track their mobile phones, the Taliban has made it a policy to keep them off, ban them, or even destroy cell towers. Thus, the Taliban’s methodology has evolved over the duration of the war, becoming more technological and focused on not wasting lives ‘to martyrdom.’
Force Multipliers, Terrorist Structures, and Operational Issues
Although the Taliban had been subdued by the US government, its networks continued to gradually advance due to force multipliers that enhanced the impact of its activities. In particular, the increased access to communication and technology solutions has greatly aided its efforts against the Afghan government and in expanding its terrorist activities (Hussaini & Morris, 2020). The Taliban depend on their religious doctrines as a force multiplier as well because it allows them to justify their actions and motivates them toward their mission.
The financial aspect of terrorism and access to resources is a major force multiplier. Terrorist groups have several financial needs ranging from money for subsistence living costs, training, recruitment, holding cells, traveling, and spreading propaganda. Thus, most of them have networks where they receive funding and financial assistance (Meszaros, 2019). The Taliban takes advantage of the drug trade in Afghanistan to obtain finances. However, they have several sources of income, including fundraisers, charitable organizations, offshore companies and entities, and common crimes (Jackson & Amiri, 2019). As a result, it has grown to become a powerful group despite the long struggle to abolish its rule.
As an organization, the Taliban is polycentric, which is uncommon for terrorist groups. Their structure formed this way because the Taliban progressed via uniting different groups of local militias which formed by themselves (Giustozzi, 2022). This structure has allowed the Taliban to suffer comparatively little damage from NATO targeting their leaders, as their deaths only disabled small units of the organization. Giustozzi (2022) argues that such a structure became a liability when the Taliban had gained the upper hand in Afghanistan, but their swift recapture of Afghanistan in 2021 makes this conclusion doubtful. At the very least, the organization’s influence in the country allowed it to negate the flaws of its structure.
The Taliban government and operational strategies are based on the idea of establishing a pure Islamic state. As a result, their top officials include their religious leaders and the group’s appointed leaders. Since 1994, the leader of the movement has been an emir, a central figure accorded powers to rule by religious leaders (Meszaros, 2019). Nevertheless, the decision-making majorly lies on the council of elders made up of powerful individuals and religious leaders.
Conclusion
Although the Taliban establishes itself as a government, its tactics and methodologies constitute acts of terrorism because it robs individuals of their human rights and reinforces strict laws that go against the tenets of freedom. The Taliban dates back to the 1990s but has enjoyed limited powers in Afghanistan because of the US military efforts against them and resistance from local communities. However, the group has remained operational and succeeded in carrying out various attacks despite being constrained. The group has a definite leadership structure and governance that allow it to carry out organized attacks. In addition, they have access to a wealth of resources and take advantage of communication technology to rein terror. Since its emergence, it has held on to its mission and ideologies of an Islamic Afghanistan without any external influences and governed by the Qur’anic laws. The group has recently regained power, putting citizens in the nation in a tough position to abide by their regulations.
References
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Giustozzi, A. (2022). The Taliban at War: 2001 – 2021. Macmillan Publishers.
Jackson, A., & Amiri, R. (2019). Insurgent bureaucracy: how the Taliban makes policy. United States Institute of Peace.
Kanayama, R. D. (2021). Regional ramifications for Taliban-controlled Afghanistan–role and position of Uzbekistan on Islamic fundamentalism 1991-2021. Sicurezza, Terrorismo E Società, 11. Web.
Hussaini, S., & Morris, T. (2020). The Taliban’s information war. Journal of Information Warfare, 19(4), 89-109. Web.
Meszaros, E. A. (2019). The Afghan Taliban: Evolution of An Adaptive Insurgency. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States. Web.
Afghan Taliban. (n.d.). Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Web.
Ruttig, T. (2021). Have the Taliban changed? CTC Sentinel, 14(3), 1-15. Web.
Schroden, J. (2021). Afghanistan’s security forces versus the Taliban: A net assessment. CTC Sentinel, 14(1), 20-29. Web.